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REPLY BRIEF
THE KIND

or

CASE

Appellants incorporate herein the
statements of the kind of case contained
in Appellants' brief (P. 1) and Respondents'
brief ( P, 1) •

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Appellants incorporate herein the
statements concerning disposition in lower
court contained in Appellants' brief CP. 1)
and Respondents' brief CP. 2), except that
th~y deny the accuracy of the statement con:a1ned in Respondents' brief concerning
~udge Neeley's alleged ruling, for the reason
that the purported ruling was not made by
1

.. ;,~e Neeley. and is not included in the

~.~ ..,,,,.. in th1 s matt er.
,Judge Neeley merely
~:~~~j A.ripellants' mo!ions to 9uash the .
~c;.;:ildint and to require the bill of pa~t1~. ; .,.. 5 ordered by .Judge Beck to be furnished.
~~ .. a .

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A~?e:lants

seek an order requiring

::·.e :-omplaint against Appel~ants to be
:J 3 shed or, in the alternative, for az:i order

iring the County Attorney to furnish the
_~{: of particulars which Judge Beck ordered.

~,.r.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants incorporate herein the
s:atement of facts contained in their brief
(P,

2-ij).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
~ANDA~US

IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY.

Respondents' brief asserts Ca) that
~andamus is not an appropriate remedy in
thi~ case because the acts sought to be
compelled are discretionary acts and that
except where that discretion is abused this
Ccurt cannot disturb the exercise of the
discretion of the inferior Court, and (b)
~hat the information sought by the Appellants
is evidentiary in nature and is outside the
scope of a bill of particulars. CP. 10-11)
Appellants acknowledge that this Court
should not usurp the discretion of an inferior
2

-__ ,. •

d '='

t 0

ma t t e rs wh i c h are pure 1 y

·. ~· - t: narv
that Court
,,.-ere
~o
. t except when
•
d
;~_- ~Jused its j:.scretion.
Respon ents
01
"
.. hat
Tudge Neeley' s refusal to quash
... 4~e
'

:;; co~plaint :::r to. compe~ the County Attorney
~:-- ~L:rnish informa t ior:i which Judge Beck had
-~,-i ,...ed :..1as a discretionary act and should
or,.e.
h.
C
~ .. ::e jisturbed by t is
curt •
.. c.
Judge Beck ~xercised the discretion
•..i:ion him by 77-21-9, UCA, 1953
(~·:· 5. of Appellants' brief) .and ord7red
.
·-e county Attorney to furnish the information
~o'JP-~t by Appellants.
Respondents admitted
·~ t'1eir answer (R. 18, Par. 6) that Judge
f~ck' s order was not overruled b Jud e
.. ee~ey s or er.
e iscretion mentioned
!n that statute has been exercised in favor
cf Appellants. The County Attorney stands
:.n :jefiance of that court order in refusing
to furnish that information to Appellants.
"1andamus is a proper remedy to enforce the
legal rights conferred upon Appellants by
Judge Beck's order.
State v. Hart, 19 U.438,
57 P. 415; Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen,
i.a u. 214, 159 P. 541: Richards v. District
Court of Weber County, 71 U. 473, 267 P. 779;
Hathaway v. McConkie, 85 U. 21, 38 P2d 300.
~ ,.ferred

Appellants are entitled, as a matter of
law, to have the complaint dismissed for
~ailure to furnish a sufficient bill of particulars as provided in 77-23-3, UCA, 1953
(?. ? of Appellants' brief), which statute
pro~1des that "A motion to quash SHALL be
available •.• ." when the prosecuting
attorney fails to furnish a sufficient bill
It is admitted by Respondents that they
•
wholly failed to answer questions 2 and 3 of
3

Jill of ~articulars which they were
~;~ered to furnish (Respondents' brief
;· ~-5).
It cannot reasonably be argued
:~at a "su!f icient" bill was supplied as
t: questions 2 and 3 when the Cou~ty Attorney
~as ordered to answer those questions but did
-r•
That statute confers no discretion
.&U"" •
~~on the :curt to refuse to quash, in the
event of an insufficient bill of particulars,
ind does confer upon Appellants the right to
~dve the complaint quashed.
Accordingly
sir1ce no discretion is involved mandamus is
ar appropriate remedy in this matter.
••

3

Respondents argue further that the
:nfarmation which they were ordered to furnish
b~t have refused to furnish, is evidentiary
and accordingly outside the scope of a bill
of particulars. 77-21-9(2) 1 UCA 1 1953 (P. 8
of Respondents' brief) expressly authorizes
the Court to require the prosecution to
furnish "facts" when "• •• the Court deems it
to be in the interest of justice • • • " and
does not limit those facts to those necessary
for the prosecution to prove its case. The
"facts" mentioned in that statute do not
exclude "facts" which are or may be used as
evidence either by the prosecution or the
defense. Respondents' contention that the
Court cannot order a bill of particulars
containing "facts" or which are "evidentiary"
is without merit.
.
Respondents argue extensively that a
blll of particulars cannot be used to obtain
~preview of the prosecution's case and thereby
i~ply that the information which they are
withholding is a part of their case, (Respondents' brief P. 13-18) however they admit

_ ,·:iere in their brief that the
·~·'°e"'m·
at ion being withheld from
Appellants
-~,tor,
.
,
•

not a part of the prosecution s case in
::;~matter. (P. 5)
Appellants are NOT
~~king :'or information pertaining to """'fne
~rcsecJtion's cas~.
~11 t~at Appellants seek
_ ; nf'orma t ion which is being supre ssed by
;~e -::~osecution and whic~ information is
,
:-.ecessary to prepar7 their ~ase. (Appellants
'.):":e f p. i+) Where inform~ t ion requested
~n a bill of particulars is z;eeded by the
~ccused in order to ena~le him ~o prepare
, ::iroDer defense, such information should
~e ~urnished even if it results in a dis.::osure of the prosecution's evidence.
·~

S

-"~R2d

458.

POINT II
SJPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO
4PPELLANTS BY PROSECUTION IS A DENIAL
')t" DUE PROCESS or LAW GUARANTEED BY THE
:J, '.3. CONS TI TUT ION.
The evidence sought by Appellants in
the bill of particulars, ordered by Judge
Beck and not supplied by the County Attorney,
constitutes (1) documents which Appellants
desire to submit to a handwriting expert to
detel'mine the identity of the person or
persons who actually issued and/or uttered
the fictitious check charged in the complaint
~iled against Appellants and ( 2) identity
Jf persons who cashed the series of checks•
one.of which is charged in the complaint filed
a~a1nst Appellants, in order that such persons
might be called as witnesses on behalf of
Appellants. The information sought is not a
?art of the prosecution's case but is evidence
5

_. _ was gathered up by the police and
·~·;·~~~eld and suppressed by the prosecution.
~~ ;··~· the information sought is favorable
1
: : t:--.~ Appellants and
is in the possession
~~ and/or available to the prosecution.
(~. 413, 50)

The cases are almost unanimous in
r:;:,lding that a person has been denied his
::..gh.t to due process of law, guaranteed to
h:..~ oy the fifth a~d f~urte~nth ~mendments
t:-. the ·~·· s. Constitution, if evidence
~av 8 rable to the accused has been deliberately
.;.mpressed by the prosecution or by the use
er' perjured testimony.
33 ALR2d 1421-1424.
:.. :onviction obtained by suppressing evidence
:avorable to the accused should be set aside
because such action is a denial of due pro:ess of law guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution, Accordingly it would be a denial
of due process to compel Appellants to
submit to a preliminary hearing without
requiring the prosecution in this case to
furnish Appellants with evidence in their
possession which is favorable to the Appellants
and necessary to prepare their defense.
In a recent prosecution for murder of
a policeman, where the state deliberately
suppressed evidence tending to show that the
fatal shot was not fired by the accused but
by another policeman, the r.ourt held that
suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused was a denial of due process. U.S.
ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi ( 19 S 2 1 CA 3rd Pa)
~~5 F2d 815, 33 ALR2d 1407, cert den 345
.;._; 90t+, 97 L. ed. 1371 1 73 S Ct 828.
The Federal Courts have long held that
6

or concealment of evidence
d •
•
•
'avoratle to the accuse is a violation of
:~r due nrocess clause of the fifth amendment
~r. t"he u. s. Constitution.
Curtis v. Rives
i~9~l' 75 App JC 66, 123 F2d 936; and that
c·~~ression or concealment of evidence favor~;l~ to the accused is a violation of the
cue process clause of the fourteenth amendment
tc the J. s. Constitution.
Mooney v. Holohan
(l335) 294 US 103• 79 L. ed. 791, 55 S Ct 340,
98 ALF 406, reh den 294 US 732, 79 L. ed. 1261,
55 s Ct 511;
Pyle v. Kansas (1942) 317 US
213, 37 L. ed. 214• 63 S Ct 177; White Thunder
''• Bunter (1945 CA 10th Kan) 149 F2d 578,
cert Jen 325 US 889• 89 L. ed. 2002• 65 S Ct
1579, 141 F2d 500; Pyle v. Amrine (1945)
195 Kan 458• 156 P2d 509. cert den 328 US 749•
9G L. ed. 448• 66 S Ct 45• reh den 326 US 809 1
9O L • e d • 4 9 3 • 6 6 S Ct 16 5 ;
U • S • ex re 1.
Montgomery v. Ragen (1949 1 DC Ill) 86 F Supp
382; Woollomes v. Heinze (1952 1 CA 9th Cal)
198 F2d 577, cert den 344 US 929, 97 L. ed.
715, 73 S Ct 499;
Burns v. Lovett (1952)
91 App DC 208 1 202 F2d 335 1 affd 346 US 137 1
97 L. ed. 1508,73 S Ct 1045; White v. Ragen,
324 US 760, 764 1 65 S Ct 978 1 89 L. ed. 1348'
Hysler v. Florida• 315 US 411• 413• 316 US
642, 62 S Ct 688• 86 L. ed. 932; Jones v.
Kentucky, 6 Cir, 97 F2d 335, 338' Soulia v.
O'Brien. DC Mass, 94 F Supp 764.
·~~ression

SLlt'

1.,.J"

•

•

State Courts considering deliberate
suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused have generally held that such conduct
is a denial of due process. Morhous v.
Supreme Court of New York (1944) 293 NY 131 1
56 NE2d 79; People v. Whitman (1945) 185
Misc 459, 56 NYS2d 89 and ExParte Lindley
(1947) 29 Cal2d 709, 177 P2d 918. The one
7

--J~

:~~ateJ

.;;~ ~ecijed

to the contrary seems to have
o~ ~rocedural grounds.
Wallace

'• '":Jster (1950) 206 ~a 561, 57 SE2d 920,
Jen 340 'JS 815, 95 L. ed. 599, 71 S

-e:~

~yrellants have no plain, speedy or
;~e~~ate remedv at law available to them,
;!~e~ :~an a writ of mandamus.
If they are

obtain the evidence
;e~e~sary to presen~ an adequate defense,
~ecause of suppression of that evidence by
·~~ ~rosecution, they will have to go through
:~e emctv formality of a preliminary hearing
an: :rial Defore the question of error by
·~e 2ourt in refusing that information can
~e ~aised on appeal.
No right to appeal from
a ~reliminary hearing exists.
The right to
a~peal from a verdict after a trial is not
a ":ila in, speedy or adequate remedy" 6 SB(a)
CRCP and accordingly this is a proper case
for the issuance of a writ of mandate.
~0!

~ermitted

tr

CONCLUSION
Appellants are not asking for this Court
to usurp the discretion of Judge Neeley or
~udge Hanson.
Respondents have admitted
that ~udge Neeley's denial of Appellants'
motions did not overrule Judge Beck's order
requiring the County Attorney to supply the
Appellants with the information demanded in
the motion for a bill of particulars. (R. 18)
JJdge Beck exercised his discretion and thereby vested Appellants with a right to receive
~hat information.
This Court is asked to
enforce that right and to compel the County
Attorney to furnish that information.
Jnder the statute 77-23-3(l)(b) Appellants
8

~p p;.:it:eJ as a matter of law to have the
~·,~~·c..:.nt against them quashed by reason of
::.~·: 3 ::Jre of the prosecution to furnish
...:~ :: i '.. ~ 0 f pa rt icu la rs or:dered by Judge

· :.
,.;r;~1:-::lants are entitled to be furnished
-~~~·t 1 e. ~nformation demanded in the bill
·;·:drticulars under the due process clauses
.~· ::ie '·• s. Constitution.
Accordingly the
;e;usa: o~ Judge Neele~ to require said
~~ormation to be furnished was an abuse of
:.:. 3 cretion and a denial of Appellants
right
~c. h.ie process of law.
Mandamus is a proper
;erredy for this abuse of discretion.
A

I'

J,.

•

'

•

Appellants have no plain, speedy or
dcequare remedy at law.
The rights herein
so Ilg ht to be enforced are vested rights of
tte Appellants, and no discretion remains
in the inferior courts concerning said matters, accordingly this is a proper case for
the issuance of a writ of mandate.

To force the Appellants to submit to a
?reliminary hearing and/or a trial without
being furnished with the evidence, gathered
up and suppressed by the prosecution, which
i.s not a part of the prosecution's case but
which is vital to Appellants' defense, would
be to deprive Appellants of their right to
the due process of law guaranteed by the u. s.
Constitution. Such suppression would make
the Appellants' right to compulsory process
t~ compel attendance of witnesses an empty
right since they could not determine their
identity to serve them with such process.
Respectfuly submitted,
Ronald c. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
\ttorney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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